Voluntary Servitude (a fiduciary relationship)

  In challenging the gov-co’s authority, Rick had denied that he’s a slave or subject to involuntary servitude (as prohibited by the 13th Amendment) but he neglected to deny that he had entered into a voluntary servitude (a fiduciary relationship) with the court, plaintiff, prosecutor, state, real party in interest, or even to the actual defendant “RICK DOE” (rather than “Rick Doe”) etc.

But I noticed one line in particular that I suspect leaves an important omission:  “I am not a slave or an involuntary servant of the State or the United States (13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution)”.

As you know the 13th Amendment prohibited 1) slavery; and 2) involuntary servitude.  But it did not prohibit VOLUNTARY servitude.
I believe that any fiduciary relationship is a “servitude” wherein the fiduciary voluntarily agrees to work for the best interests of his beneficiary.  Historically, those people who became officers of the de jure State were fiduciaries and We the People were the beneficiaries.  You can see some evidence of this at Article 1.2 of The Constitution of The State of Texas which declares (roughly) that “this constitution was established by the People of Texas and for their benefit”.  We the People are the beneficiaries.  They, the government, are suppose to be our fiduciaries (servants; public servants, in this case).  When they take the Oath of Office, they are supposed to enter into that voluntary servitude on behalf of the People of The State of Texas.

Government doesn’t want to be our (public) servant.  I believe that they have therefore devised various schemes to trick us into “voluntarily” entering into fiduciary relationships (“servitude”) wherein the modern “government” is the beneficiary and we are its fiduciaries.
I only skimmed your document, but so far as I can see, you have failed to inform them that you are not only not subject to 1) slavery; and 2) INVOLUNTARY servitude; but also that 3) you deny that you have VOLUNTARILY entered into any fiduciary relationship/servitude wherein the gov-co is the beneficiary and you are the fiduciary.

I don’t know what the truth is, but I strongly suspect that they are proceeding against you based on the presumption that you’ve entered into one or more voluntary servitude (fiduciary relationships) with the government of “this state” (not a State of the Union, but probably a territory) and you are being charged not as a debtor, per se, but as a fiduciary who has BREACHED his fiduciary obligations to “this state” (your presumed “beneficiary”/ “god”).

When I was hauled off to Missouri for most of a year, I signed all of my paperwork “at arm’s length” to signify that I was signing everything in a NON-FIDUCIARY capacity.  They had alleged I was guilty of TWO felonies–non-support of a child.  I knew the allegations were based on fraud.  Nevertheless, the Missouri court intended to find me guilty and imprison me.  But, that imprisonment would not have been based on my debt, it would be based on my alleged breach of fiduciary obligation to the child and/or her mother.

I don’t know why the court ultimately refused to prosecute me, but I’m convinced that because I’d signed all of my paperwork “at arm’s length”–including the Waiver of Extradition document that was signed and sealed by a Dallas court judge–they could not proceed against me.  I.e., I qualified my signature in the Waiver of Extradition in Dallas so as to agree to be extradited to Missouri on condition that I was extradited in a non-fiduciary capacity.  The Dallas judge signed and sealed that agreement making it absolutely admissible evidence.  Missouri unwitting accepted me for extradition under those conditions and didn’t realize what they’d done until I arrived on Missouri.

The allegations against me were based on breach of a fiduciary relationship (presumably a voluntary servitude), but Missouri had accepted me in a non-fiduciary capacity.  Therefore, they could not proceed against me.
They held me 344 days and then released me.  Spending 344 days in the slammer is hard to describe as a victory, but my alternative would be to have “voluntarily” consented to being a fiduciary, be convicted of breach of fiduciary obligation, and I’d be a convicted felon today–perhaps still peeing on command into a cup.

I don’t know that denying that you have voluntarily entered into a fiduciary relationship with the court, the city/county/state/US will save you in this matter.  But “voluntary servitude” is another “rat-hole” that you should also “plug” in your defense.

If I were you, I’d expressly deny under oath that I’d voluntarily entered into any fiduciary relationship (voluntary servitude) with the plaintiff, the court or any entity the prosecutor is alleged to represent.  If that sworn denial is properly made, you create an issue, a point of contention that strips the court of its capacity to presume that you are a fiduciary in this matter.  At that point, the prosecutor should (in theory) be compelled to produce evidence that you are, in fact, a fiduciary for the plaintiff/prosecutor/real party in interest.

I doubt that they’d dare to produce such evidence in court and “let the cat out of the bag”. But even if they did produce such evidence, it would almost certainly be document (say, an application for a drivers license, or a bank account “signature card” or some such) that bears your solitary signature.  The evidence wouldn’t be a contract because it wouldn’t have two signatures on it.  Therefore, there’d be no requirement for full disclosure on the document nor could there be a meeting of the minds since there weren’t two signatures, two parties, or two “minds” involved in signing that document.

The document would have only one signature (yours) and might be called a “unilateral contract” but I suspect that description would be misleading.  A one-person signature probably can’t be a “contract”–but it could be a pledge.  That unilateral pledge (by you and you alone) would probably be deemed evidence of you have voluntarily entered into a fiduciary relationship (voluntary servitude) with the plaintiff/prosecutor/state.

In the unlikely event that the prosecutor produced such evidence, your defense is probably pretty simple.  If the evidence against you is a document bearing only one signature (yours), then you and you alone know what the document means.

Again, if there aren’t two signatures, there can’t be a “meeting of the minds” where the meaning is agreed to or determined by both parties.  If you’re the only one who signed the document, you’re the only one who knows what you intended the document to mean.

If the prosecutor or judge says or implies that the document is evidence that you entered into a fiduciary relationship with the plaintiff/prosecutor/state, you could simply and honestly say that you had no intention of voluntarily entering into a “servitude” (fiduciary relationship) when you signed the document; that you signed as a mere “witness” (or you might have some other honest explanation for your signature)–and that if the court tried to compel you to perform as a fiduciary in this matter based on your signature to the document, that such compulsion would subject you to involuntary servitude–which is absolutely prohibited by the 13th Amendment.

The tricks to this strategy are 1) create EVIDENCE that you have not KNOWINGLY and  VOLUNTARILY entered into a fiduciary relationship with any entity associated with the prosecution of the case; and 2) get that EVIDENCE into the case record.

You can probably create evidence by filing an affidavit of denial of fiduciary relationship into the county record.  You might do well to make sure that certified copies of such affidavit were submitted to the judge, the court clerk, the prosecutor and any entity that the prosecutor seems to represent.  And, if it were me, I’d get those copies to them long before the case came to court.  If they see what’s coming, they might make the case disappear.
If you wait to use the “non-fiduciary” defense until you’re actually in court at trial, you might get lucky–but more than likely, they’ll find you guilty and let you take your non-fiduciary argument up on appeal.

This non-fiduciary defense is not guaranteed to work, but it might work.  It’s an additional line of defense that I’d include if I were in your situation.
In the meantime, I’d make a habit of signing everything I sign with the “at arm’s length” disclaimer.  I’d be prepared mentally to deny that any document carrying only my signature was intended by me to be pledge to enter into a voluntary servitude.

I wouldn’t be the least bit surprised if the critical one-signature “pledges” in your case were the traffic tickets that I presume you signed when the tickets were issued.  I’d expressly deny under oath that I knowingly and voluntarily signed any of those tickets with the intent to enter into a “servitude” to the plaintiff/prosecutor/court/state, etc.  I might explain that I signed those tickets only as witness to the allegations written by the police officer.

Incidentally, if you look at the traffic tickets, you’ll probably find the traffic cop’s name printed out, or maybe his initials, but I doubt that you’ll find his signature.  If you do, it’ll probably be in a “box” that’s excepted from the rest of the ticket.
Or–if you find the traffic cop’s signature out in the “open” on the same ticket that contains your signature, then my speculation about the traffic ticket being a unilateral “pledge” to enter into a fiduciary relationship with the court/state/prosecutor etc. is probably mistaken.

Think about that: “this state” is the place, plane or jurisdiction where “this state” has the power to DEFINE offenses . . . not the power to enforce, or impose, demand, regulate or control. No, “this state” is based on the power to DEFINE.

If that’s true (and Article 1.04(d) says it is), then definitions are the heart of every penal offense and the foundation of every agencies and court’s penal jurisdiction. If “this state” exists only where (or perhaps even “when”) it has the “power to define,” then “this state” could theoretically be made to disappear by simply declaring that you were subject to a different set of definitions.

A first question to an agency of “this state” might be to 1) advance Texas Penal Code article 1.04(d) description of “this state’s” territorial jurisdiction; then 2) ask the Agency to declare where that Agency has “power to define offenses” relative to the Constitution of The State of Texas; and 3) ask where is the contract where YOU agreed to be bound by “this state’s” definitions?

The object is to distinguish “this state” from “The State” and make “this state” admit that distinction. Once the distinction between the “The State” (which has public law) and “this state” (which appears to be all private law) is admitted, if there is no contract or other agreement where you agreed to be bound by the definitions of “this state,” “this state” will have no jurisdiction over you. We might be able to force them to either not answer, or to admit that “this state” has no territorial jurisdiction relative to The Constitution of The State of California.

If it’s true that “this state” is based on private agreements and private law, then the “power to define offenses” (Texas Penal Code 1.04) could only apply “privately” to YOU when YOU agreed by express contract or implied trust to be bound by their definitions. In other words, the “power to define offenses” must be consented to.

When you “agree” to use FRNs to “pay” (rather than merely “discharge”) your bills as if the FRNs were “money,” you’ve accepted “this state’s” definitions and stepped into the place where “this state has power to define offenses”. Truth is, you don’t “pay” any debt with FRNs (except possibly the loan of FRNs). You merely “discharge” your debts with FRNs. Every statement (notice; not “bill”) that you receive includes words like “please pay,” “payment due by November 1st,” etc. But the truth is that you actually “pay” only in “this state” according to “this state’s” definitions where “payment” is presumably defined to include “discharge”—but you do not truly “pay” in the historic definition of The State where the debt is extinguished with specie.