Thursday, January 25, 2018

Revoke states trusteeship over the vehicle never pay registration again.


§ 9-109. Classification of Goods: “Consumer Goods”; “Equipment”; “Farm Products”; “Inventory”.
Goods are

(1) “consumer goods” if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes;

(2) “equipment” if they are used or bought for use primarily in business (including farming or a profession) or by a debtor who is a non-profit organization or a governmental subdivision or agency or if the goods are not included in the definitions of inventory, farm products or consumer goods;

Relevant applicable stare decisis case cites relating directly to UCC 9-109:

“Under UCC §9-109 there is a real distinction between goods purchased for personal use and those purchased for business use. The two are mutually exclusive and the principal use to which the property is put should be considered as determinative.” James Talcott, Inc. v Gee, 5 UCC Rep Serv 1028; 266 Cal.App.2d 384, 72 Cal.Rptr. 168 (1968).

“The classification of goods in UCC §9-109 are mutually exclusive.” McFadden v Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 8 UCC Rep Serv 766; 260 Md 601, 273 A.2d 198 (1971).

“Automobile purchased for the purpose of transporting buyer to and from his place of employment was ``consumer goods'' as defined in UCC §9-109.” Mallicoat v Volunteer Finance & Loan Corp., 3 UCC Rep Serv 1035; 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. App., 1966).

“The provisions of UCC §2-316 of the Maryland UCC do not apply to sales of consumer goods (a term which includes automobiles, whether new or used, that are bought primarily for personal, family, or household use).” Maryland Independent Automobile Dealers Assoc., Inc. v Administrator, Motor Vehicle Admin., 25 UCC Rep Serv 699; 394 A.2d 820, 41 Md App 7 (1978).

Federal Case Law Confirms

United States District Court,
D Maine, September 15, 1972
Bankruptcy No. BK 72-129ND, No. EK 72-13OND

[9-109] Consumer goods - automobile for transportation to and from work.

The use of a vehicle by its owner for purposes of traveling to and from his employment is a personal, as opposed to a business use, as that term is used in UCC § 9-109(l), and the vehicle will be classified as consumer goods rather than equipment.

The phraseology of § 9-109(2) defining equipment as goods used or bought for use primarily in business seems to contemplate a distinction between the use of collateral “in business” and the mere use of the collateral for some commercial, economic or income-producing purpose by one not engaged “in business.”

The appropriate filing place turns upon the classification of the collateral as consumer goods or equipment. The Uniform Commercial Code classifies goods as consumer goods

“. . . if they are used or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes. (2). Fn (2) 11 MRSA § 9-109(1).

It is the court's opinion that the use of a vehicle by its owner for purposes of traveling to and from his employment is a “personal,” as opposed to a business use, as that term is used in UCC § 9-109 (1). The phraseology of UCC § 9-109 (2), defining “equipment” as goods used or bought for use primarily “in business” seems to contemplate a distinction between the use of collateral “in business,” and the mere use of the collateral for some commercial, economic or income-producing purpose by one not engaged “in business.”

Traveling to and from work is a PERSONAL use NOT a BUSINESS use!

This ruling is consistent with the undisputed fact that “The classification of goods is determined by its primary use” (Barron’s Law Dictionary, Third Edition, 1991) and not by the type of goods, including, but not limited to, vehicles:


A vehicle not used for commercial activity is a “consumer goods”, . . . it is NOT a type of vehicle required to be registered and “use tax” paid of which the tab is evidence of receipt of the tax.” Bank of Boston v. Jones, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 1021, 236 A2d 484, UCC PP 9-109.14.

“Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled.” Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20.

“The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.” Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907).

“A soldier's personal automobile is part of his “household goods[.]” U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235” 19A Words and Phrases - Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94.

“... [T]he exemptions provided for in section 1 of the Motor Vehicle Transportation License Act of 1925 (Stats. 1925, p. 833) in favor of those who solely transport their own property or employees, or both, and of those who transport no persons or property for hire or compensation, by motor vehicle, have been determined in the Bacon Service Corporation case to be lawful exemptions. --In re Schmolke (1926) 199 Cal. 42, 46.

“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty.... It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day; and under existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or to operate an automobile thereon for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property for hire along the street, which the city may permit or prohibit at will.” --Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579.

“In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising officials “may” exempt such persons when the transportation is not on a commercial basis means that they “must” exempt them.” --State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. section 94, page 581.

This document is called the M.S.O, or the Manufacturers Statement of Origin. which verifies where the car came from and other details unique to the vehicle. 
Now, what has slipped under the radar is the M.S.O is the actual proof of ownership of the vehicle. I quote the newstory I found this on: ]
Manufacturer's Statement of Origin is proof of ownership, legal title to the automobile,

Now the M.C.O is not only proof of ownership, but it is also an "Allodial Title". Here is an explanation of what an allodial title is.

So if you have the M.C.O to your vehicle, you not only own that vehicle, you're also exempt from any taxes that your state tries to levy against it. You would no longer have to pay taxes on that vehicle or "registration" fees. IT CAN NOT EVEN BE IMPOUNDED IF YOU GET PULLED OVER.

Once the new car hits the showroom floor, the M.C.O is surrendered to the state in which is has been delivered to. When you finally buy this vehicle for whatever price, you are given a "Certificate of Title" which is merely proof that the M.C.O exists. This "certificate of title" is really only legal jargon for "You can now register the fact that you have this car in your possession."

The process begins with the "surrender" of the Manufacturer's
Statement of Origin (MSO) by the auto dealer to the Department of
Revenue in exchange for a Certificate of Title.

Ownership of an automobile must be
surrendered to the State before it can be registered?".

The certificate of title to your automobile is Not title, it's merely
evidence that title exists. Your car's legal TITLE is the MSO, which the
dealer surrendered to the State. the MSO is put on
microfilm for permanent keeping, the original is destroyed.

That's the law, but it's voluntary.

Our state's destroy the M.S.O and put it on microfilm, so it can never be recovered by the owner.
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA)


California Vehicle Code section 4000(a) is the law that requires registration of Motor Vehicles. The history of this section can be dated back to the Statutes of 1913 Chapter 326. The Department of Motor Vehicles own website refers to this statute as being the first one to require licensing and registration of Motor Vehicles. 
MOTOR VEHICLE ACT 1915 (Statute 1915 Ch. 188.)

The term “person” was defined under section (17) of the act. According to this section the registration and licensing requirements only applied to juristic “persons” meaning other than a natural person or chauffeurs (people who are compensated for transporting person for hire or compensation). During this time it was well recognized by courts all over the country that the citizen had a right to use the highways in the ordinary course of life and to use the ordinary conveyance of the day which at this time included an automobile. This was so well established it was published in the legal encyclopedia 11 AmJur 1st Section 329:
“Personal liberty largely consists of the Right of locomotion — to go where and when one pleases — only so far restrained as the Rights of others may make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. The Right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horse drawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but the common Right which he has under his Right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Under this 

Constitutional guarantee one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s Rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”

The Statute of 1913 was amended by Statute 1915 Ch. 188. This new statute retained the basic limitations on the registration requirements to only juristic persons. It was amended by statutes of 1917, ch 218 and Statute 1919, ch 147. These amendments were merely refinements and did not make substantive changes.

The major changes began in 1923 with the Statutes of 1923 ch. 266. This time it defines the word “operator” and gave it much more general application by including “natural persons” in the law. However 2 week later in the same session of the legislature the Statutes of 1923 ch. 211 was passed providing a more constitutionally correct definition of “operator” and restricted the licensing and registration requirements once more to only juristic persons. Furthermore section 12 of this statute puts it in clear focus. “All acts and parts of acts in conflict herewith are hereby repealed…”

Since the earlier act was in conflict with the later act it repeals the earlier one puts the registration and licensing provisions back in the limited nature of only applying to juristic persons once again. This continued until the very first vehicle code was enacted by the Statutes 1935 Ch. 27. This was the act that established the Vehicle Code. Section 2 of this act makes it clear that the Vehicle Code is not to be construed as a new body of law but as a consolidation and continuation of already existing law. In order to understand what statutes were consolidated into the code you have to look at Section 802 which repealed certain acts and statutes 1923 ch. 266 was one of those statutes that was repealed. Furthermore section 803(c) declared that “Except as provided in Section 802, this code does not repeal any existing statute, nor any sentence or clause thereof.”

From the very beginning of the code, it is clear that there is no express or even implied repeal of the exemption for the private, non-commercial use of an automobile. With this historical context in mind we can now evaluate and explain how this historical analysis relates to the modern vehicle code section 4000(a).                                 

It’s helpful to look at the follow sections in the current version of the vehicle code to fully grasp the history of section of 4000(a) and how it’s suppose to be applied today. These sections are Section 2, 4, 260(a) and (b), 415(a) and 15210(p)(7).
Section 2 confirms that the code is simply a continuation of existing law and not to be construed as a new enactment. Remember revised code is not law, the legislative bill is the written law that the code is suppose to reflect accurately, which they seldom do, especially when the state can make billions by making it vague.
Section 4 secures rights that have already been established and reiterates that rights are not effected by the provisions of the code.

Section 260(a) defines a commercial vehicle as a vehicle required to be registered under the code and section.
C.V.C. 260(b) tells us that a passenger vehicle is not a commercial vehicle and is therefore not required to be registered under the code.
Section 15210 (p)(7) is a little hidden section in the code that reads “Absent any federal definition the definitions of this code shall apply.”
Section 415(a) defines a motor vehicle as “any vehicle which is self propelled” However this section does not apply since there is a federal definition of motor vehicle in Title 18 USC section 31 where it defines a motor vehicle as “every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways in the transportation of passengers, passengers and property, or property or cargo”.                                              

Conclusion is that 4000(a) is a law that requires registration of vehicles that are used for transporting persons and property for hire, because the vehicle code is nothing more than a consolidation of laws that regulated “for profit” use of the highways.
Nebraska (1905) has close to the same language “vehicles offered to the public for hire”.  Most literate police officers know this but ignore it to keep their job security.  Woe to such for this is organized crime, extortion, theft by deception. 

This is “evidence of law” good in any State /United States courts.  The same process is remove us from property tax obligations as well. 

A little clarification above, for hire is an “act” not a “person” as we know it, but an immigrant is a “person” that comes for gain (commercial reasons) so one must understand the distinction then the written law makes more sense. 

American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA)


Follow these steps to take back ownership of your private vehicle. And never Pay  Registration, Tax, Have a Driver License, ever again.

All registered vehicles are property of the state California, therefore are subject to their laws regarding acting in commerce on the road.  Thought you owned your vehicle? Well you don’t. You don’t even own your house, your kids, your land but that another issue for later. How did you lose owner ship without your knowledge? The process begins like this:
            The "surrender" of the Manufacturer's Statement of Origin (MSO) by the auto dealer to the Department of Revenue in exchange for a Certificate of Title. When you buy a vehicle for the first time byway of car loan, ownership of an automobile must be surrendered to the State before it can be registered.  What they don’t tell you is, because you don’t own the vehicle yet, the dealership sends the MSO (which is the legal title to the vehicle, proof of ownership.) to the California Department of Revenue in exchange for a Certificate of Title which is what you receive (Pink Slip). It's merely evidence that title exists.
What it really means is now you can pay to register the states property which they now own.  What you have in your possession is a vehicle that you’re borrowing from the state. But you’re paying twice the amount to use it. (1) You’re paying the (states) car loan every month; (2) You’re paying driver’s license every four years, registration yearly, and smog every two years for the privilege of using the states property.  
The State then takes the MSO and puts it on microfilm for permanent keeping, the original is destroyed so you can never get your hands on ownership of states property you paid for. This is all done under your nose, without your consent. It’s fraud, Extortion. The State then pays the dealership a finder’s fee for sending the MSO to them instead of to the car loan company till you paid it off.

How to regain ownership?

1.    You must get original MSO impossible, most states destroy them.       Therefore you must revoke the states trusteeship over the motor   vehicle.

2.    Purchase it with a Bill of Sale including a Bill of Conveyance along   with $21 silver and the balance in FRN’s to transfer allodial title.

3.    Return the “Certificate of Title”, registration and plates to DMV.

4.    Dismantle, savage or export to a foreign jurisdiction OR register it in   a company or trust organization.

5.   Travel by right freely in your private property OR lease the vehicle   from a company or trust organization.

If the “Certificate of Title” is presently in your name, you must notify the State of your allodial ownership via a Bill of Conveyance or the MSO if can locate it.

Post a Comment